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I. INTRODUCTION

It is hard not to sympathize with the thrust of Michael A.
Newton's impressive article "How the International Criminal Court
Threatens Treaty Norms." A friend of the ICC keen to see it thrive,
Newton offers some home truths with a view to correcting what he
suggests is a damaging tendency towards jurisdictional overreach on
the part of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and, through the OTP,
the Court. Many readers may find themselves nodding along to the
gist of the argument, which puts its finger on something in claiming
that the Court is insufficiently sensitive to the finely wrought
framework of jurisdictional allocation reflected in the Rome Statute.
Sure, one may wonder whether the blame lies solely or even chiefly
on the OTP. The Al Bashir debacle, 1 for one, is at least as much the
fault of the Pre-Trial Chambers and Registrar as of the Prosecutor,
although it is true that this tussle involves the Court's competence to
proceed with a request for surrender, rather than to entertain
proceedings; and when it comes to Newton's examples of the
situations in Afghanistan and Palestine, the Prosecutor is yet to
proceed beyond preliminary examination. One may equally wish to
reflect on some of the article's more detailed reasoning. But there is
evident sense in Newton's call for prosecutorial respect for the terms

* Professor of Public International Law, University College London.
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See ROGER O'KEEFE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 569-73 (2015).
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of States Parties' conferral of power on the Court, in particular as it
relates to their other treaty arrangements.
Where the reader may differ from the approach taken in the
article, even if not necessarily with its practical upshot in specific
circumstances, is in its analysis of the jurisdiction conferred by States
Parties on the Court in respect of their territory. The maxim nemo
plus iuris transferre potest quam ipse habet emphasized by Newton
cannot be gainsaid. The question, however, is less quantum iuris, or
how much right a state possesses and passes on, than quid ius or
quia Jura, or which right or rights. Jurisdiction is not a solid block of
"right." It is a subtle layering of different rights, whose existence,
moreover, must be distinguished from their exercise. While a state
may undertake by treaty to refrain from exercising one or more of
these rights, it still retains them and is competent to confer them in
their plenitude on the ICC. True, the state will be obliged to the
extent of its other treaty undertaking to refrain from the exercise of
these rights through the medium of the Court. But Article 98 of the
Rome Statute provides a purpose-built mechanism to prevent the
Court from obliging a State Party to act in breach of a treaty
undertaking not to exercise one or more of its jurisdictional rights. In
short, the Court may not ride roughshod over a variety of other
treaty-based jurisdictional arrangements agreed by States Parties.
The Court remains competent, however, to entertain proceedings in
such cases, whatever this may mean for breach by the state of its
other treaties.

II. THE ROME STATUTE'S DELICATE BALANCE

Mike Newton's article performs a considerable service in
reminding the reader of some incontrovertible tenets of the law of
international organizations (loosely so called in the case of an organ
like the ICC) and of the law of treaties. First, the ICC is competent to
exercise only that power vested in it by the States Parties to its
Statute. In turn, the States Parties are not competent to transfer to
the Court a power that they do not possess. Nemo plus iuris
transferrepotest quam ipse habet, as Cicero may or may not have put
it. Secondly, a treaty may not lawfully diminish the international
legal rights of states not party to it 2-that is, of what the law of

2.
Note that the formulation of the rule pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt in
Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) does not adequately
reflect customary international law. It is not simply that a treaty may not create
obligations or rights for third states without their consent. It is also the case that a
treaty may not impinge upon the legal rights of third states without these states'

consent. See, e.g., Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, 1966 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMMISSION 187, 226

2 ("nor modify in any way their legal rights without
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treaties refers to as "third states."3 States Parties to an agreement
that infringes the rights under international law of a third state
commit an internationally wrongful act against that state. Thirdly,
while specific treaty provisions, the customary international rules of
treaty interpretation, and canons of treaty application such as the lex
specialis and lex posterior maxims may go some way to avoiding
conflict between a state's multiple treaty obligations, customary
international law contains no legal means of deciding which of two
unavoidably conflicting treaty obligations is to take priority. A state
that becomes party to more than one treaty on the same subject may
render itself the servant of two unrelenting masters.
More to the point, Newton is probably right to suggest that the
OTP has shown less care than advisable towards the delicate balance
struck in the Rome Statute between States Parties' obligations in
relation to the ICC and their jurisdictional obligations to third states.
The incaution, however, has arguably related more to the Court's
competence to proceed with requests for surrender than to its
competence to exercise jurisdiction over given persons and to states'
customary obligations under the law of jurisdictional immunities
than to their jurisdictional arrangements under treaties. But be that
as it may. There is, one cannot help feel, a large grain of truth in
Newton's argument that the Prosecutor would do well to be more
solicitous of the terms of the delegation by States Parties of power on
the Court.

III. A STATE'S

"JURISDICTION" AND THE DELEGATION OF ITS EXERCISE
TO THE COURT

Where one might beg to differ with Newton is in his analysis of
the jurisdiction in respect of their territory conferred by States
Parties on the Court. There is no doubting the maxim nemo plus iuris
transferre potest quam ipse habet. The question is how it applies in
the present context. In the final analysis, the situation is both more
complicated and more straightforward than Newton's reasoning
suggests.
The key to understanding here lies in the protean concept of
state "jurisdiction." In Newton's article we find repeated reference to
the "quantum" of jurisdiction enjoyed by states over their territory
and therefore capable of being conferred by them on the Court. But
their consent."); Island of Palmas (Neth./U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 842 (1928); ARNOLD
(LORD) MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 321 (1961).
3.
A "third state" is standard terminology in the law of treaties for a state not
party to a given treaty. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(1)(h), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 1969, 8 I.L.M. (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT]
("'Third State' means a State not a party to the treaty.").
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jurisdiction is not a quantity. It is a complex-a complex of rights,
and of rights the existence of which is not to be confused with their
exercise. A state's "jurisdiction" in respect of its territory and its
conferral of the same on the Court can be accurately analyzed only by
4
appreciating certain crucial distinctions.
It is first necessary to distinguish among the three distinct rights
encompassed by the term "jurisdiction," clarity with regard to which
is perennially confounded by the fact that each is referred to in its
own right as "jurisdiction." These three distinct rights are
traditionally labelled jurisdiction to prescribe, jurisdiction to
adjudicate and jurisdiction to enforce. 5 Jurisdiction to prescribe refers
to a state's right under international law to assert the applicability of
its law to given circumstances, whether by means of primary or
subordinate legislation, executive decree, or judicial action. 6 In the
criminal context, jurisdiction to prescribe can be described simply as
7
a state's right under international law to criminalize given conduct.
Jurisdiction to adjudicate refers to a state's right under international
law to entertain legal proceedings in respect of given circumstances,
which in the criminal context means given conduct. 8 In the criminal
context, jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to adjudicate go
hand in hand. 9 Jurisdiction to enforce refers to a state's right under
international law to deploy investigative, coercive or custodial
powers, whether through police or other executive action or through
its courts. 10 The point here is that reference in an international

4.
It is also necessary to appreciate that the international lawfulness of one
state's jurisdiction is without prejudice to the international lawfulness of another's.
Jurisdiction may be concurrent. In the case of jurisdiction to prescribe and to
adjudicate, the fact that another state has the right under customary international law
to criminalize and adjudge the conduct, wherever committed, of its nationals and
foreign members of its armed forces in no way diminishes the right of the state where
the conduct is committed to criminalize and adjudge conduct committed by whomever
in its territory. That said, jurisdiction may equally be exclusive. It depends on the
terms of any specific agreement or customary international rule in play.
5.
See O'KEEFE, supra note 1,at 4-6.
6.
Id. at 4.
7.
Id. at 5.
8.
Id. at 4.
Indeed, separate reference to jurisdiction to adjudicate is generally
9.
unnecessary in the criminal context, where the universal practice is that municipal
courts will not apply foreign law. In other words, in the criminal-law context, it can be
assumed that a municipal court is applying the law of the forum state, and the
application of a state's law by its courts is simply the exercise or actualization of
prescription, amounting as it does to an assertion that the law in question is applicable
to the relevant person. See id. at 5. That said, there is no harm in referring to a state's
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon criminal matters, and there are instances in which
distinguishing between jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to adjudicate in the
criminal context can have explanatory value.
10.
Id. at 4-5. In the criminal context, jurisdiction to enforce can be described
in concrete terms as a state's right under international law to arrest and retain custody
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agreement to a state's "jurisdiction" is not necessarily and not usually
to all three distinct rights-or, putting it another way, to all three
distinct "jurisdictions"-potentially encompassed by the term. It may
be and usually is to only one or two of them.
It is just as necessary, when considering a state's "jurisdiction,"
to distinguish between the existence of jurisdiction and its exercise.
The fact that a given exercise of jurisdiction by a state would be
contrary to its international obligations is without prejudice to the
internationally lawful possession of the underlying jurisdiction to be
exercised. In the case of jurisdiction to adjudicate, a state's treaty
undertaking or customary obligation to refrain from prosecuting a
given category of persons in no way diminishes its right under
customary international law to entertain criminal proceedings in
respect of conduct committed in its territory. A state's right under
customary international law to entertain criminal proceedings in
respect of conduct committed in its territory is without regard to the
identity of the author of the conduct, to the nature of the conduct, and
so on. It is plenary, and it remains so even where the state
undertakes not to exercise it in given circumstances. The present
relevance of the distinction between the existence of jurisdiction and
its exercise is that reference in an international agreement to
"jurisdiction" may be to that jurisdiction's existence or to its exercise.
These two distinctions are critical when considering the legal
effect of treaty provisions, such as those found in status of forces
agreements (SOFAs) and the like, which provide that given personnel
"are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction"'1 1 of the sending state, as
well as of treaty provisions concerning the jurisdictional immunities
to be accorded certain categories of persons.
When analyzed closely, in particular in the context of
surrounding provisions, 12 what is meant by "jurisdiction" in the
over persons and vessels, to have a court sit, to incarcerate persons and confiscate
property, to undertake surveillance, to stop and search, to take physical measures to
prevent or repress the commission of a crime, to investigate and to collect evidence, to
issue subpoenae ad testificandum and subpoenae duces tecum, and so on-in short, to
exercise any or all of the usual range of police, prosecutorial, judicial, and related
executive powers in relation to criminal justice. See id. at 5.
See, e.g., Military Technical Agreement Between International Security
11.
Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan Annex A, 3,
Jan. 4, 2002 [hereinafter Military Technical Agreement] (applicable in respect of all
ISAF and supporting personnel in Afghanistan).
12.
In the case of Annex A, 3, of the Military Technical Agreement between
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Interim Administration of
Afghanistan, crucial context is afforded by the other paragraphs of Section 1
("Jurisdiction") of Annex A. Paragraph 1 provides that "[t]he provisions of the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 13 February
1946 concerning experts on mission will apply mutatis mutandis to the ISAF and
1. In turn, while § 22 of the Convention on Privileges
supporting personnel." Id. at
and Immunities indicates that ISAF and supporting personnel are to benefit while in
Afghan territory from immunity (in reality, inviolability) from arrest and detention-a
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phrase "subject to the exclusive jurisdiction" is the exercise of
jurisdiction to enforce and to adjudicate. In relation to jurisdiction to
enforce, such a provision represents, first, an expression by the
receiving state of the necessary consent to the otherwise-unlawful
deployment in its territory by the sending state of investigative,
coercive, and custodial powers over the sending state's personnel and,
secondly, an undertaking by the receiving state not to exercise over
those personnel its own right under customary international law to
deploy such powers in its territory. In relation to jurisdiction to
adjudicate, which as a matter of customary international law is
concurrent in the criminal context as between the receiving state (in
its capacity as the territorial state) and the sending state (in its
capacity as the state whose nationals or members of its armed forces
the personnel in question are), the relevant provision represents an
undertaking by the receiving state not to exercise over the personnel
sent its customary right to entertain criminal proceedings in respect
of conduct committed in its territory. What such a provision does not
represent is the surrender by the receiving state of its very right to
entertain criminal proceedings in respect of conduct committed in its
territory. The receiving state continues to possess this right, which is
without regard to the identity of the author of the conduct, to the
nature of the conduct, and so on. The right is plenary and remains so
even where the receiving state undertakes not to exercise it in given
circumstances.
Similarly, when a treaty provides for "immunity from the
criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State"13 in respect of a given
point reiterated in Military Technical Agreement, Annex A, 4-and immunity ratione
materiae "from legal process of every kind," § 23 of the Convention indicates that these
immunities may be waived. Id. at 4; Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations art. VI, Feb. 13, 1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 15. Were Afghanistan to have
surrendered its very rights not only to enforce and to adjudicate but also to prescribe in
respect of ISAF and associated personnel, rather than merely to have undertaken not
to exercise over such personnel its rights respectively to enforce and to adjudicate,
waiver would be of no consequence, since Afghanistan would possess no rights to arrest
and detain and to prosecute such personnel or to criminalize their conduct in the first
place. The fact that Afghanistan retains under the Military Technical Agreement its
right to regulate by its criminal and other law the conduct of ISAF and associated
personnel is underlined in Annex A, 2, which provides that ISAF and supporting
personnel "will respect the laws of Afghanistan." Military Technical Agreement, supra
note 11, at Annex A 2.
See, e.g., Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 31(1), Apr. 18,
13.
1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. [hereinafter VCDR] (relating to a diplomatic agent accredited to
the receiving state). Again, the fact that the immunity can be waived by the sending
state, in accordance with article 32, indicates that it constitutes merely a bar to the
exercise by the receiving state of its jurisdiction to adjudicate, not to the existence of
this jurisdiction, let alone to the existence of its jurisdiction to prescribe. Id. art. 32.
That the immunity from criminal jurisdiction provided for by, inter alia, the VCDR is
merely procedural, not substantive, was emphasized by the International Court of
Justice in Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v
Belgium), ICJ Rep 2002, 3, 25, 60.
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category of persons, it is referring to no more than the exercise by the
receiving state of its jurisdiction to adjudicate. Such a provision
represents an undertaking by the receiving state not to exercise any
right it may enjoy to entertain criminal proceedings against such a
person, a right it does indeed enjoy in respect of conduct committed
by that person in its territory. Again, a provision of this sort does not
represent the surrender by the receiving state of its very right to
entertain criminal proceedings in respect of conduct committed in its
territory. Again, the receiving state continues to possess this right,
which is unaffected by the identity of the author of the conduct, the
nature of the conduct, and so on.
In turn, by way of Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute, a
receiving State Party to the Statute delegates to the ICC the exercise
of its customary right to entertain criminal proceedings in respect of
the crimes specified in Article 5 of the Statute when these crimes are
committed in its territory. Since its treaty-based acknowledgement of
the "exclusive jurisdiction" of the sending state or its according of
immunity from its "criminal jurisdiction" in no way diminishes the
plenary right it possesses under customary international law to
entertain criminal proceedings in respect of crimes under Article 5 of
the Statute committed in its territory, a receiving State Party is
competent to confer on the Court a plenary "jurisdiction" over such
crimes. In short, the scope of the Court's jurisdiction over genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed in the territory
of a State Party is unaffected by the terms of any SOFA or analogous
agreement or any treaty provision on jurisdictional immunities by
which the State Party may be bound.
But this is not the end of the story.
A State Party's delegation to the ICC of the exercise of what is
its plenary right to entertain criminal proceedings in respect of
crimes under Article 5 of the Statute committed in its territory
nonetheless has implications for any treaty undertaking by it to
refrain from entertaining criminal proceedings against a given
category of persons. 14 A State Party's surrender for prosecution by
the Court of a person whom it has undertaken not to prosecute would
constitute a breach by that State Party of its undertaking, 15 since it
would amount to the prosecution by that state, via the medium of the
16
Court, of the person.

14.
A fortiori,it has implications for any treaty undertaking by the State Party
to refrain from exercising custodial powers over the same persons.
15.
A fortiori, it would constitute a breach of any undertaking by the State
Party to refrain from exercising custodial powers over that person.
16.
See, to this effect, Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-1497, Appeals
Chamber Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga Against the Oral Decision
of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case, 83 (Sept. 25,
2009), as affirmed in Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01105-01/08-962, Appeals Chamber
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In a partial attempt to obviate such a situation, the drafters of
the Rome Statute included in it Article 98(2), which provides:
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require
the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under
international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is
required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can
first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the
surrender. 17

Article 98(2) is designed to bar the Court from obliging a State
Party to act in breach of the sort of treaty undertaking to another
state 18 not to exercise one or more of its jurisdictional rights typically
found in SOFAs and the like, although there is no reason why it
cannot cover other agreements falling within the terms of the
provision. In addition, Article 98(1) provides:
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which
would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations
under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a
person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the
19
cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity.

The provision makes no reference to the immunity of heads of
state, heads of government, ministers for foreign affairs, or any
others who may benefit under customary international law or treaty
from immunity ratione personae. It is generally accepted, however,
that the reference to "diplomatic" immunity is to be interpreted to
encompass other comparable immunities recognized by customary
international law and applicable treaty. 2 0 It is also taken as read that
Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo Against the Decision of
Trial Chamber III of 24 June 2010 Entitled 'Decision on the Admissibility and Abuse of
Process Challenges', 1 74 (Oct. 19, 2010).
17.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 98(2), U.N. Doc.
AICONF.183/9, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (July 17, 1998), entered into force July 1, 2002,
reprintedin 37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
18.
Unlike Article 98(1) of the Statute, article 98(2) does not apply only in
respect of third states-that is, in the case of Article 98(2), in relation only to
international agreements between States Parties and states not parties to the Statute.
Id. Rather, the Court may not proceed with a request for surrender if this would
require a State Party to breach a SOFA or cognate international agreement even with
a sending State Party, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending
State Party for the giving of consent for surrender. That said, it might be expected in
practice that the Court would either, first, in the exercise of its powers under article
87(1)(a), request the sending State Party to give its consent to surrender, a request
binding on that other State Party by virtue of Article 93(1)0); or, secondly, in
accordance with Article 89(1), issue a binding request to the sending state to surrender
the individual itself. Id. arts. 87, 93, 89.
19.
Id. art. 98(1).
That article 98(1) was textually capable of application to heads of state was
20.
not questioned in Prosecutor v. Omar Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Pre-Trial Chamber
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the reference to "immunity" encompasses inviolability. 2 1 In short, it is
an overstatement to suggest that the ICC may disregard alternative
jurisdictional arrangements agreed on by way of treaty by States
Parties to the Rome Statute.
The fact remains, however, that the scope of the Court's
jurisdiction to entertain proceedings in respect of the commission on
the territory of a State Party of one or more of the crimes under
Article 5 of the Rome Statute is not circumscribed by any SOFA or
like treaty or any treaty regulating immunity from criminal
proceedings to which a State Party may be party. If a person covered
by such a treaty is surrendered to the Court by another State Party
or a third state for prosecution for a crime committed in the territory
of a State Party treaty-bound to refrain from prosecuting that person,
the last will stand in breach of its treaty obligation, since it will in
effect be prosecuting the person.

IV. CONCLUSION

The question of the ICC's jurisdiction over crimes committed in
the territory of a State Party is both more complicated than Newton
suggests, insofar as a state's territorial "jurisdiction" is not unitary,
and more straightforward, insofar as the lawful scope of the
jurisdiction delegated to the Court by way of Article 12(2)(a) of the
Rome Statute is precisely as the Statute indicates. But insofar as
"How the International Criminal Court Threatens Treaty Norms"
represents a loyal call for greater concern on the part of the OTP for
the fine balance of jurisdictional allocation to which the States
Parties to the Statute commit themselves, the article is on the money.
Either way, Newton's excellent piece makes an original and bracing
contribution to the debate.

Corrigendum to the Decision pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the
Failure by the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by
the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir
(Dec. 13, 2011), in Prosecutor v. Omar Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Pre-Trial Chamber
Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Refusal of the Republic
of Chad to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to
the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Dec. 13, 2011), or in any
of the many subsequent decisions on point in Al Bashir.
For the use of the term "immunity" to cover both immunity stricto sensu
21.
and inviolability, see, e.g., Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the
70, 71 and 75.
Congo v Belgium), ICJ Rep 2002, 3, 29-31,

